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Note
Late for an Appointment: Balancing Impartiality
and Accountability in the IRS Office of Appeals
David Hahn
And some tax collectors also came to be baptized, and they said to him,
“Teacher, what shall we do?”1

INTRODUCTION
Larry Tucker didn’t pay his taxes for three years.2 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed a lien on his property. Tucker
objected, offering instead to pay off his liabilities in a compromise settlement, but the IRS representative refused.3 Frustrated
with the adverse result, Tucker attacked the system that
brought it about, claiming that the method of choosing that representative was unconstitutional.4 The implications of his claim
reach far beyond IRS human resources policy: Can an adjudicator in any agency be both “impartial”5 and “politically accountable”?6 And what role does the agency’s structure play in answering that question?
Taxpayers in Tucker’s situation can challenge an IRS collection action by requesting a collection due process (CDP) hearing

 J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful to Professor Kristin Hickman for helping me develop this topic and offering
guidance along the way; to Professor Christopher Roberts for serving as my advisor and providing useful feedback; to Trevor Matthews and Franklin Guenthner for their thorough and thoughtful comments throughout many drafts; and
to the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review for their hard editorial
work. Most importantly, thank you to Amy Lohmann and to my parents, Margaret and Victor Hahn, for their unwavering support. Copyright © 2018 by David Hahn.
1. Luke 3:12–13.
2. Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 117–18 (2010), aff ’ d, 676 F.3d 1129
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 116–17.
5. See infra note 14 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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before an “impartial officer” or employee of the IRS Office of Appeals.7 The purpose of the hearing is to resolve tax disputes before litigation and to balance efficient tax collection with the
rights of the taxpayer.8 Taxpayers may appeal an adverse CDP
determination to the U.S. Tax Court.9 For the last twenty years,
CDP hearings have played a central role in the tax collection process.10
CDP officers wield substantial government power. They
have wide discretion in determining the appropriateness of collection actions, and they have the power to bind the government.11 And these hearings are not rare; the IRS Office of Appeals received 43,749 CDP cases in Fiscal Year 2016 and
resolved 41,380 in the same period.12 When a taxpayer submits
an offer-in-compromise, the CDP officer is the face of the agency,
and when that offer is successful, the hearing is the whole of the
taxpayer’s adversarial interaction with the IRS.13
CDP officers are not meant to be political agents of the IRS.
On the contrary, they have a statutory duty to be “impartial.”14
They are not writing regulations or creating policy; they merely
apply existing policy to decide the appropriateness of an individual collection action.15 Like other members of the federal civil
service, CDP officers enjoy protection against political retaliation and can contest adverse employment actions before the
Merit Systems Protection Board, meaning—effectively—that
they are only removable for good cause.16
This combination of power and protection places CDP officers in a constitutional conundrum. The Appointments Clause of
the Constitution imposes procedural constraints on the appointment of all “Officers of the United States.”17 The President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, must appoint all “principal
7. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017).
8. Id. § 6330(c)(3)(C).
9. Id. § 6330(d)(1).
10. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE IRS COLLECTION PROCESS: PUBLICATION 594, at 4 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p594.pdf [hereinafter IRS
COLLECTION PROCESS] (describing the role of the CDP hearing).
11. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
12. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2016 DATA BOOK 50 (2017), https://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-soi/16databk.pdf.
13. See infra note 64.
14. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3).
15. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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officers,” but Congress may vest the appointment of “inferior officers” in “the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or the Heads
of Departments.”18 By giving Congress the power to create offices, but the executive and judicial branches the power to fill
them, the Clause promotes the separation of powers.19 It adds
transparency to the appointment process, ensuring that government officers are accountable to the politicians that appoint
them and, by extension, to the public.20 Courts and commentators have struggled to define an “Officer of the United States”
and what differentiates “inferior officers” from “principal officers,” but there is consensus that these terms have a broad
sweep.21 A recent surge of separation-of-powers litigation has
seen many litigants arguing that government officials are unconstitutionally appointed.22
But appointments are only half of the equation. The Supreme Court has struck down restrictions on officer removal
when those restrictions severely limit the President’s ability to
oversee the execution of the laws.23 If the Appointments Clause
is meant to provide political accountability, the Court reasoned,
then there must be a way to hold officers accountable, and the
most obvious way is removal.24 If CDP officers are Officers of the
United States, then they must be appointed consistent with the
Appointments Clause.25 But if the limitations on their removal
18. Id.
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
20. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997).
21. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the definition of “inferior officer” as “unusually broad”); Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 74 (2007) (describing an “inferior officer”
as anyone who holds a position that is “continuing” and “invested by legal authority with a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal government”);
James Heilpern, Ode to the Assistant Doorkeeper of the House of Representatives,
YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT BLOG (Apr. 2, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/
ode-to-the-assistant-doorkeeper-of-the-house-of-representatives-by-james
-heilpern (noting that an eighteenth-century assistant doorkeeper to the House
of Representatives was called an officer).
22. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); Burgess v. FDIC, 871
F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2017); Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (challenging the appointment of SEC administrative law judges); Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114 (2010), aff ’ d, 676 F.3d
1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
23. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 492 (holding that two layers of “good
cause” removal protection for Board members is unconstitutional).
24. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 664 (“The power to remove . . . is a powerful
tool for control.”).
25. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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improperly insulate them from political accountability, they may
no longer be able to enjoy civil service protections.
Litigants have argued that CDP officers are unconstitutionally appointed. The U.S. Tax Court rejected such a challenge in
2010, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.26 Both opinions rested on
reasoning that has since been called into question, and neither
addressed CDP officers’ civil service protections. Several cases
currently pending before the U.S. Tax Court could allow more
circuits to consider the issue soon.27
There is reason to believe that new cases will yield different
results. There is growing scholarly and judicial support for a formalistic and wide-ranging definition of “Officer of the United
States”28—one that could encompass both administrative law
judges (ALJs)29 and informal agency adjudicators.30 The Supreme Court has been open to examining these questions.31 Even
so, if current appointments are unconstitutional, there is considerable disagreement over the appropriate solution.32
26. See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 114.
27. See Respondent’s Response to Motion to Remand at 1, Thompson v.
Comm’r, No. 7038-15L (T.C. Jan. 5, 2018) (arguing that CDP officers are not
subject to the Appointments Clause); Petitioner’s Motion to Remand at 1, Elmes
v. Comm’r, No. 24872-14L (T.C. Sept. 30, 2017) (arguing that CDP officers are
subject to the appointments clause); Order at 1, Fonticiella v. Comm’r, No.
23776-15L (T.C. Aug. 9, 2017) (denying petitioner’s motion for recusal on
grounds that the President’s authority to remove Tax Court judges does not violate separation of powers principles).
28. See generally John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 2007 PATENTLY O-PAT. L.J. 21, 21 (2007); Jennifer Mascott, Who
Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 454 (2018) (arguing
that the original public meaning of “Officer of the United States” is “one whom
the government entrusts to perform a statutory duty of any level of importance”).
29. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–54 (2018) (holding that ALJs
in the SEC are officers); see also Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 898 F.3d
669, 679 (6th Cir. 2018).
30. See, e.g., Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying
Which Government Workers Are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76
MO. L. REV. 1143 (2011) (arguing that CDP officers must be constitutionally
appointed).
31. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053–54 (considering whether ALJs are officers).
32. See id. at 2055 (remanding case for a new hearing before a different
ALJ); id. at 2064 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that remanding for a new hearing before the same ALJ poses no Appointments Clause or
Due Process violation). Compare Thomas C. Rossidis, Article II Complications
Surrounding SEC-Employed Administrative Law Judges, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
773, 777–78 (2016) (advocating reappointment of ALJs by SEC Commissioners,
protection of past rulings under a “de facto officer” doctrine, and continued dual-
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The combination of a broad officer definition and close scrutiny of removal restrictions could leave any government agency
that employs career civil servants vulnerable to constitutional
challenge. This trend could undermine both formal and informal
agency adjudication, affecting the way agencies structure their
adjudicatory procedures, who is chosen for adjudicative roles,
and to whom those adjudicators are accountable. This dilemma
highlights a tension between formalist and functionalist constitutional interpretation: How should the strict construction of
constitutional text interact with pragmatic historical practice
when deciding these questions?33
This Note straddles the line between formalism and functionalism. It first observes that—for better or worse—CDP officers are likely Officers of the United States and therefore require
constitutional appointment. CDP officers exercise substantial
discretion while carrying out statutorily-mandated duties that
play a crucial role in the tax collection process.34 Because of the
supervision they face from the Agency, they are likely inferior—
rather than principal—officers. The previous cases that addressed the issue were wrongly decided, and even if they were
correct at the time, recent Appointments Clause litigation calls
their reasoning into question.35
This Note also addresses an issue previous courts and commentators have not considered: whether CDP officers’ civil service protections are unconstitutional restrictions on their removal. It concludes that those protections are not only
constitutional under current Supreme Court precedent but are
also a normative good, preserving the impartiality that Congress
contemplated.36 While this Note focuses on CDP officers, it rec-

layer good-cause removal protections), with Memorandum from Professor Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji to the Senate & the House of Representatives
1 (Nov. 7, 2017) (advocating the abolition of 158 ALJ positions and the addition
by legislation of circuit court judgeships).
33. Compare NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (Breyer,
J.) (“[T]he longstanding ‘practice of government’ . . . can inform our determination of ‘what the law is.’” (first quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401
(1819); and then quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803))), with id.
at 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[P]ast practice does not, by
itself, create power.” (quoting Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008))).
34. See infra notes 58–64 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
36. See I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017) (requiring that officers conducting CDP
hearings be impartial).
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ognizes the implications these questions have for informal adjudicators throughout the administrative state.37
Part I discusses the statutory and regulatory scheme underlying CDP hearings and traces the history and purposes of the
Appointments Clause, highlighting key doctrinal developments
in the last ten years. Part II analyzes how courts disposed of earlier Appointments Clause challenges to the CDP process, explains how recent litigation casts those decisions into doubt, and
concludes that CDP officers are likely inferior officers. Part III
recommends that Congress provide for the appointment of CDP
officers by the Secretary of the Treasury to promote prospective
accountability for the quality of CDP decisions but concludes
that CDP officers’ civil service protections are constitutional because of their adjudicative role.
I. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND CDP HEARINGS
The IRS Office of Appeals has, for years, provided taxpayers
a venue to appeal adverse decisions internally before taking disputes to court.38 For most of the twentieth century, the IRS enjoyed considerable discretion in how to structure those appeals.39
In response to rising concerns for taxpayer due process rights,40
Congress passed the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
(RRA), establishing the CDP process and requiring the Agency
to follow certain procedures in its execution.41 Section A discusses the power and prominence of CDP officers under that legislation.
Whether those statutory changes transformed CDP officers
from mere IRS employees to Officers of the United States requires a precise understanding of both the power they exercise
37. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 549–88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (compiling an appendix of twenty-four departments and 573 career-appointed positions arguably occupied by Officers of
the United States who are subject to two layers of for-cause removal protections).
38. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., HISTORY OF APPEALS, 60TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION 3–6 (1987).
39. Andrew Strelka & Sean Morrison, The IRS and America’s Longest Running ADR Program, 63 FED. LAW. 28, 28 (2016) (citing INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., HISTORY OF APPEALS, 60TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION (1987)) (describing
the series of appeals schemes the IRS created by regulation before procedures
were mandated by statute).
40. See S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 67 (1998) (“The Committee believes that
following procedures designed to afford taxpayers due process in collections will
increase fairness to taxpayers.”).
41. See I.R.C. § 6330.
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and how courts have applied the Appointments Clause to date.
To lay this foundation, Section B discusses the history of the Appointments Clause, articulations of its broad sweep, and how recent courts have applied it to administrative adjudicators.
A. THE IRS OFFICE OF APPEALS AND COLLECTION DUE PROCESS
HEARINGS
CDP hearings have become a fixture of the tax collection
process.42 A brief summary of that process helps illustrate their
significance.
1. Tax Collection Generally
Uncontested tax collection follows a fairly simple process.
First, the IRS makes an assessment to establish the amount
owed, commonly through the filing of a federal tax return.43
When the amount already paid exceeds the amount owed, the
IRS issues a refund. When the taxpayer owes additional taxes,
the IRS issues a bill for the unpaid amount.44
Complexities arise if the taxpayer does not pay. If the tax
remains unpaid ten days after the taxpayer receives notice of an
assessment and a demand for payment, a federal tax lien attaches to the taxpayer’s property.45 The IRS provides a Notice of
Federal Tax Lien (NFTL) to the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s
other creditors, establishing the priority of the IRS’s claim.46 The
NFTL may negatively impact the taxpayer’s credit score.47
If a taxpayer still does not pay after a lien attaches, the IRS
may levy the taxpayer’s property.48 A federal tax lien establishes
a legal claim to the taxpayer’s property, but a levy involves an
actual seizure of the property. This can involve a physical seizure

42. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 137–39 (2010), aff ’ d, 676 F.3d 1129
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (describing the role of the CDP hearing).
43. IRS COLLECTION PROCESS, supra note 10, at 2.
44. Id.
45. Danshera Cords, How Much Process Is Due? I.R.C. Sections 6320 and
6330 Collection Due Process Hearings, 29 VT. L. REV. 51, 55 (2004). The tax lien
arises automatically after nonpayment of the first tax bill and applies to all of
the taxpayer’s current and future property, including “a house or car, and rights
to property, such as wages and bank accounts.” IRS COLLECTION PROCESS, supra note 10, at 4–5.
46. IRS COLLECTION PROCESS, supra note 10, at 5.
47. Id.
48. Cords, supra note 45.
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(e.g., of a house or a car) or a seizure of rights to property (e.g.,
garnishment of wages or Social Security payments).49
2. The Collection Due Process Hearing
The tools of tax collection give the IRS substantial power.50
Over the years, both Congress and the Agency have created procedures to protect taxpayers from the arbitrary exercise of that
power. The RRA created the CDP hearing to balance efficient tax
collection with the “legitimate concern of the taxpayer that the
collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.”51
Within five days after a federal tax lien arises, the IRS must
send the taxpayer a notice of: (1) the amount of unpaid tax; (2)
the right to request a CDP hearing within 30 days; and (3) the
proposed collection action.52 A taxpayer that returns a written
request53 is entitled to a CDP hearing before an “impartial officer,” which the statute defines as an “officer or employee who
has had no prior involvement with respect to the unpaid tax.”54
No statutory provision expressly creates either the Office of Appeals or CDP officers. Regulations allow the hearings to be conducted by (1) Appeals Team Managers; (2) Settlement Officers;
or (3) Appeals Account Resolution Specialists.55 For simplicity’s
sake and because the statutory duties are the same, this Note
refers to these positions collectively as “CDP officers.” In the absence of an organic provision specifically creating CDP officers,
the IRS staffs the Office of Appeals through its generic hiring

49. IRS COLLECTION PROCESS, supra note 10, at 5. If a taxpayer remains
“seriously delinquent” on his or her debt, there may be additional consequences,
including a legal summons to meet with the IRS or passport revocation. Id.
50. Commentators have noted that these tools give the IRS substantially
more power to collect than a private creditor enjoys. See, e.g., Leslie Book, The
Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or a Step in the Right Direction?, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2004).
51. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 68 (1998).
52. I.R.C. § 6330(a)(3) (2017). The notice typically must precede the collection action, but the IRS has promulgated regulations allowing for post-levy
notice where the tax collection is in jeopardy or involves a state tax refund. Id.
§ 6330(a)(1)–(2); see Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6330-1(a)(2)(i)–(ii) (2018).
53. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(c)(2).
54. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3). Elsewhere in the RRA, Congress required that the
IRS implement a reorganization plan that includes a prohibition on ex parte
communications between Appeals Officers and other IRS staff “to the extent
that such communications appear to compromise the independence of the appeals officers.” Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(a)(4) (1998).
55. IRM 8.22.4.5 (Aug. 9, 2017).
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provision.56 The Tax Court noted in dicta that if the Appointments Clause does apply to CDP officers, the current hiring procedures do not amount to a constitutional appointment.57
At the hearing, the CDP officer must first verify that the IRS
has abided by applicable law and administrative procedures.58
The taxpayer may then raise “any relevant issue relating to the
unpaid tax . . . including (i) appropriate spousal defenses; (ii)
challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions; and (iii)
offers of collection alternatives.”59 The taxpayer can challenge
the underlying liability if not previously afforded an opportunity
to do so.60 After considering the IRS’s compliance with procedural requirements, the issues raised by the taxpayer, and
“whether any proposed collection action balances the need for
the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the
person that any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary,” the officer issues a determination.61
CDP officers’ decision-making is subject to several forms of
supervision, but they retain significant discretion. For example,
the Internal Revenue Manual instructs CDP officers to request
legal advice from the Associate Chief Counsel on “novel or significant” legal issues.62 When the CDP officer determines that
there is a “lack of uniformity . . . on the disposition of [an] issue,”
she must obtain a Technical Advice Memorandum from the Office of the Chief Counsel.63 When the technical advice is favorable to the taxpayer, the CDP officer must follow it, but the officer
retains the discretion to settle cases notwithstanding non-favorable technical advice.64
56. See I.R.C. § 7804(a) (authorizing the Commissioner “to employ such
number of persons as the Commissioner deems proper for the administration
and enforcement of the internal revenue laws”).
57. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 126 (2010), aff ’ d, 676 F.3d 1129
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that the IRS’s hiring procedures do not conform to the
Appointments Clause).
58. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1).
59. Id. § 6330(c)(2).
60. Hoffman v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 140, 145 (2002).
61. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3).
62. IRM 8.6.3.4 (Oct. 6, 2016).
63. The Internal Revenue Manual leaves the determination of the appropriateness of seeking such a memorandum to the discretion of the CDP officer.
IRM 8.6.3.2.3 (Oct. 6, 2016) (“Appeals determines whether to request a
TAM . . . .”).
64. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(f ) (9)(viii)(c) (2018); see also IRM 8.6.3.3.2 (Oct. 6,
2016). IRS regulations also impose guidelines concerning when officers may accept an offer from a taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(f ) (2). CDP officers refer a
taxpayer’s offer-in-compromise to the “centralized offer-in-compromise” (COIC)
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The taxpayer (but not the IRS) may appeal the CDP officer’s
determination to the Tax Court.65 The Tax Court reviews the
CDP determination for abuse of discretion unless the underlying
tax liability is at issue, in which case the Tax Court reviews the
determination de novo.66 The Office of Appeals retains jurisdiction to conduct future hearings with respect to its determinations.67
As federal employees, CDP officers enjoy significant civil
service protections. The purpose of the civil service is to ensure
that hiring and promotion decisions are based on merit and to
protect career federal workers from political pressure and retaliation.68 As non-senior employees in a cabinet-level agency, CDP
officers are part of the competitive service.69 Competitive service
employees may appeal certain adverse employment actions—including removal—to the Merit Systems Protections Board
(MSPB) for a determination of whether good cause existed.70 The
members of the MSPB are appointed by the President and are
themselves removable only for cause.71 The result is that CDP
unit for processing. If the COIC unit rejects the offer, the CDP officer still makes
a final determination. IRM 8.22.7.10.4.5 (Aug. 9, 2017). When the amount of
compromised, unpaid tax exceeds $50,000, the officer must obtain a favorable
opinion from the IRS General Counsel. I.R.C. § 7122(b). When relieving a taxpayer of liability through a closing agreement, the officer must obtain the Secretary’s approval. Id. § 7121(b).
65. Id. § 6330(d)(1).
66. Sego v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604, 609–10 (2000).
67. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(3). A taxpayer who does not timely request a CDP hearing may still request an equivalent hearing. Equivalent hearings are prescribed
entirely by regulation rather than by statute, but their procedures closely mirror CDP hearings, and taxpayers may raise all the same issues. See Treas. Reg.
§ 6330-1(i)(1); LAURENCE F. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 13C:11 n.70–74
and accompanying text (4th ed. 2018). But unlike in CDP hearings, equivalent
hearings do not require the IRS to halt collection actions, and decisions resulting from equivalent hearings are not appealable to the Tax Court. Treas. Reg.
§ 6330-1(i)(2), A-16.
68. See 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(8) (2017) (“Employees should be . . . protected
against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political
purposes.”).
69. See id. § 2102(a) (defining competitive service to include all positions
not specifically excepted, requiring Senate confirmation, or in the Senior Executive Service).
70. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(1) (2018). Employees in “excepted” positions do not
have these rights. See Excepting Administrative Law Judges from Competitive
Service, Exec. Order No. 13,843, 88 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-excepting
-administrative-law-judges-competitive-service (purporting to except administrative law judges, thereby depriving them of civil service protections).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d).
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officers, in effect, enjoy two layers of good-cause protection from
removal: their own civil service protections combined with those
of the MSPB. These protections constitute a multi-layered statutory and regulatory framework, a contrast to the discrete forcause removal provisions of other statutes.72
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
The Appointments Clause requires that all “officers of the
United States” be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate, but it allows Congress to vest the appointment of “inferior officers” in the President alone, the
“Courts of Law,” or the “Heads of Departments.”73 The Clause
does not define “officer” or “inferior officer,” and disputes over its
applicability center around these terms.
Traditionally, the removal power is incident to the executive’s appointment power.74 Statutory schemes that go too far in
inhibiting that power unconstitutionally intrude on the President’s obligation to execute the laws.75 A complete picture of an
officer’s appointment, therefore, requires accounting for removal
from office.
This Section provides a brief history of the Appointments
Clause and the removal power. It outlines the Clause’s intended
purpose, describes its contemporary interpretations, and explores the difficulty courts have had in applying it to formal and
informal administrative adjudicators.
1. Origins and Purpose
The Appointments Clause has its roots in complaints about
pre-Revolutionary British colonial administration.76 The king
would create offices in the colonies and hand-pick the people to
fill them; colonists saw many of these offices as simply a waste

72. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2017) (“The President may remove the
Director [of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau] for inefficiency, neglect
of duty, or malfeasance in office.”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010) (severing for-cause removal
provisions).
73. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
74. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 509.
75. See id. at 492 (holding that two layers of for-cause removal protection
for members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board violated the
separation of powers); see also U.S. CONST. art. II.
76. Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1147.
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of their resources.77 To alleviate this problem, the Founders imposed limitations on the installation of individuals that wield
government power.78 The Clause separates the legislative power
to create offices from the executive power to fill them.79
Cabining the appointment and removal powers in a limited
and identifiable group of individuals promotes transparency and
political accountability. Citizens unhappy with the performance
of government workers know who to blame and can remedy those
grievances through the democratic process.80 The appointing official will—at least in theory—anticipate this accountability and
ensure that the individual being appointed is qualified and capable of doing the job.81 Citizens unhappy with an officer can exert political pressure on the appointer to remove the appointee
from office.
2. Who Is an “Officer of the United States”?
Most disputes involving the Appointments Clause involve
the distinction between officers and mere employees of the federal government.82 Typically, an “officer” for purposes of the Appointments Clause is a means through which the President executes the law.83 An officer therefore wields some form of federal
power, often executive.84
Early cases addressing the distinction offer little clarity. In
1867, for example, the Supreme Court held that “tenure, duration, emolument, and duties” characterize an office.85 In another
77. Id. at 1147–48.
78. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659, 663 (1997); Officers of
the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 75
(2007).
79. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659; see also Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 75 (2007); Lindstedt, supra
note 30, at 1147.
80. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976); Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018); Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
83. Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause,
31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 79 (2007) (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922
(1997)) (relating the Appointments Clause to the requirement that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 3)).
84. Id. at 76–79 (describing the delegation of a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal government as an essential element of an office).
85. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1867).
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case, the Court held that any individual “who can be said to hold
an office” must be constitutionally appointed.86 These decisions
offer no clear standard, but they suggest the term officer covers
a wide range of government workers. Following these early
cases, the Appointments Clause received relatively little attention until 1976.
The Supreme Court articulated the modern officer standard
in Buckley v. Valeo: “[A]ny appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of
the United States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the
manner prescribed by [the Appointments Clause].”87 Applying
this test to the Federal Election Commission, the Court identified three categories in the Commission’s duties: informative,
rulemaking, and adjudicative/enforcement.88 The Court held
that, while the Commission’s informative duties—i.e., investigative and reporting tasks—were not significant, its rulemaking
and adjudicatory functions were.89 Buckley’s standard has been
the basis of Appointments Clause analyses ever since, but a clear
definition of significant authority has proved elusive.90
In Freytag v. Commissioner, the Court applied the Appointments Clause to special trial judges (STJs) in the U.S. Tax
Court.91 The Internal Revenue Code allows the Chief Tax Judge
to assign STJs to hear enumerated categories of cases as well as
“any other proceeding which the chief judge may designate.”92
STJs can enter final judgments in the enumerated categories,
but can only offer recommended resolutions in the other cases
assigned by the Chief Judge.93 The Court noted that the office of
STJ is “‘established by Law’ . . . and the duties, salary, and
means of appointment . . . are specified by statute.”94 STJs “take
testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence,

86. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878).
87. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 137.
89. Id. at 126.
90. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991); Bandimere v. SEC,
844 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018); Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Tucker v.
Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
91. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870.
92. I.R.C. § 7443A(a)–(b) (2017).
93. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 876–77 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II).
94. Id. at 881.
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and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.”95 All of this added up to the significant authority required
for officer status.96 Moreover, the fact that STJs perform some
less significant tasks was beside the point: just because “an inferior officer on occasion performs duties that may be performed
by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not
transform his status under the Constitution.”97 Nearly identical
characteristics led the Court to hold in Lucia v. SEC that ALJs
in the Securities and Exchange Commission are officers.98
The Supreme Court sidestepped an opportunity to clarify its
significant authority standard in Lucia.99 And while lower courts
and commentators have proposed a range of frameworks,100 officer status seems ultimately to depend on a collection of factors,
including but not necessarily limited to: (1) whether the office at
issue is “established by law;”101 (2) whether its “duties, salary,
and means of appointment . . . are specified by statute;”102 (3)
whether the alleged officer’s decisions are final;103 (4) whether
the office is subject to formal procedures in its proceedings;104 (5)
whether the alleged officer exercises “significant discretion;”105
(6) whether the position is “continuing;”106 and (7) whether the

95. Id. at 881–82.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 882.
98. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–54 (2018).
99. Id.
100. See also Lindstedt, supra note 30; Mascott, supra note 28. Compare
Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 301 (5th Cir. 2017) (concluding “that final decision-making authority is not a necessary condition for Officer status” and highlighting other relevant criteria), and Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179
(10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (concluding that the three
characteristics from Freytag were the proper framework), with Lucia, 138 S. Ct.
at 2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “the ability to make final,
binding decisions on behalf of the Government” is a requisite component), and
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (highlighting both “the
authority to render the final decision” and the ability to make one’s own factual
findings as important tests).
101. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1179.
102. Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881).
103. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133; see also Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2065 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
104. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82.
105. Id. at 882.
106. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
539–40 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Officers of the U.S. Within the
Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 74 (2007)).
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office is “invested by legal authority with a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal government.”107 There is considerable
disagreement over what these factors mean, how to properly
weigh them, and which of them are required for officer status.108
The result is a notion of officer that is both vague and exceedingly broad, potentially reaching roles in nearly all corners
of the federal government.109 One court illustrated the breadth
of the term by simply listing some of the roles held to fall in the
category:
















a district court clerk;
an “assistant-surgeon;”
“thousands of clerks in the Departments of the Treasury, Interior, and the othe[r]” departments;
an election supervisor;
a federal marshal;
a “cadet engineer” appointed by the Secretary of the Navy;
a “commissioner of the circuit court;”
a vice consul temporarily exercising the duties of a consul;
extradition commissioners;
a U.S. commissioner in district court proceedings;
a postmaster first class;
Federal Election Commission (FEC) commissioners;
an independent counsel;
Tax Court special trial judges; and
military judges.110

For this reason, and because of the lack of clear guidance from
the Supreme Court, deciding whether an individual is an officer
frequently comes down to comparing the duties of the office at
issue with those previously designated officers.111
107. Id.
108. See also Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments
Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 74 (2007) (describing an “inferior officer” as anyone
who holds a position that is “continuing” and “invested by legal authority with
a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal government”). Compare Landry,
204 F.3d at 1125 (holding that the FDIC’s ALJs are not inferior officers because
they lack final decision-making authority), with Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297,
302 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that an inferior officer must exercise “significan[t] . . . duties and discretion” and that final decision-making authority is not
dispositive of the question).
109. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2065 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
vast majority of those who work for the Federal Government are not ‘Officers of
the United States.’”).
110. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018).
111. See, e.g., Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047–48 (noting the many characteristics
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3. Principal Versus Inferior Officers
The Appointments Clause applies to all “Officers of the
United States,” but it prescribes different requirements depending on whether the officer is “principal” or “inferior.”112 Whereas
the test for defining an officer focuses on the individual’s duties
and authority, principal or inferior status depends on the officer’s relationship to other government officials.
Edmond v. United States is the leading modern case on the
principal-inferior distinction.113 In that case, the Court held that
military judges on the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals
are inferior officers.114 An inferior officer, according to the Court,
is one “whose work is directed and supervised at some level by
others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the
advice and consent of the Senate.”115 The word inferior, then,
does not indicate that the officer’s authority is necessarily less
significant than a principal officer’s; it just means that that authority is subject to supervision.
The Coast Guard judges in Edmond faced substantial supervision from both the Judge Advocate General and the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces.116 They were required to comply
with procedural rules made by other Executive Branch officials
and faced automatic review by the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces in certain categories of cases.117 The upshot, according to the Court, is that the judges “ha[d] no power to render
a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted
to do so by other Executive officers.”118 Courts have relied on the
Edmond subordination test ever since.119

ALJs share with the STJs in Freytag).
112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
113. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
114. Id. at 665.
115. Id. at 663; see also id. at 662 (“Whether one is an ‘inferior’ officer depends on whether he has a superior.”).
116. Id. at 664.
117. Id. at 664–65.
118. Id. at 665.
119. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 510 (2010); Ass’n of Am. R.R.s v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19,
36 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd.,
684 F.3d 1332, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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4. Who Can Appoint?
The Appointments Clause provides a default rule: the President must appoint “Officers of the United States” with the advice and consent of the Senate.120 Even if an officer is inferior,
that default rule applies unless Congress provides for appointment by the President alone, a “Head of Department,” or a
“Court of Law.” Both terms have inspired judicial debate, and
while a full exploration of that debate is beyond the scope of this
Note, a brief summary is necessary.
The meaning of “Court of Law” for Appointments Clause
purposes is far from certain. The Freytag Court, while unanimous as to the inferior officer status of STJs and even as to the
constitutionality of their appointment, split five to four on the
reasoning.121 The majority concluded that the U.S. Tax Court is
a Court of Law.122 It reasoned that, even though the Tax Court
was not created under Article III, it exercises the “judicial power
of the United States” and performs “exclusively judicial functions.”123 Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, disagreed
sharply; in his view, only Article III courts could exercise the judicial power of the United States.124 Because the Founders would
not have conceived of courts outside the context of Article III, he
reasoned, only Article III courts could be Courts of Law for purposes of the Appointments Clause.125 The D.C. Circuit later held
that the Tax Court is a Court of Law for the Appointments
Clause but does not exercise “the judicial power of the United
States.”126 Because the Court endorsed Justice Scalia’s Freytag
concurrence on other grounds in a later case, there is a real possibility that Courts of Law are limited to Article III.127
Justice Scalia would have held that the Tax Court is a “department,” with the Chief Tax Judge as its “head.”128 While the

120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
121. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
122. Id. at 891–92.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 908–09 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. Id. at 903.
126. Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929, 940–42 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
127. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 510–11 (2010).
128. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 914 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
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majority had concluded that a Department must be “like a Cabinet-level department,”129 Justice Scalia concluded that a department must merely be a “separate organization” within the Executive Branch with independent organization.130 A Head of
Department must be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.131
Under either approach in Freytag, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is likely not a Head of Department. If a Department must be a cabinet-level agency, this is clear; despite its size
and significance, the IRS is not a cabinet department. And under
Justice Scalia’s independent organization approach, the result is
the same; because the IRS is a subordinate agency in the Department of the Treasury, it is likely not a separate organization or
allotment. The Tax Court has assumed this result in dicta.132
The Head of Department for IRS workers, therefore, is likely the
Secretary of the Treasury.
5. The Removal Power
In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court announced,
as a general rule, that the President has an unrestricted power
to remove executive officers.133 That removal power flows from
the right to appoint the officer.134 Because a purpose of the Appointments Clause is to ensure political accountability for an officer’s performance, it follows that the appointer must have some
degree of control over the appointee; removal is the most basic
and powerful mechanism of exercising that control.135
But in some cases, an officer’s role justifies a greater degree
of independence from the President. In such cases, the Court has
upheld removal restrictions. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United
States, the Court held that Congress could restrict the removal
of principal officers in the Federal Trade Commission to cases of

129. Id. at 915.
130. Id. at 920 (citing 1 N. Webster, AMERICAN DICTIONARY 58 (1828)); see
also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 511 (describing a “Department” as a “freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or contained
within any other such component”).
131. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 919.
132. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 125–26 (2010), aff ’ d, 676 F.3d 1129
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
133. 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
134. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
509 (2010) (The Constitution does not enumerate a removal power).
135. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”136 The
Court justified its holding by noting that, while the function of
the officer in Myers was “purely executive,” Federal Trade Commissioners played a “quasi[-]legislative” and “quasi[-]judicial”
role, which made a degree of independence desirable.137
While the Federal Trade Commissioner in Humphrey’s Executor was a principal officer, the Court has also upheld restrictions on the removal of inferior officers.138 In Morrison v. Olson, the Court held that the Ethics and Government Act did not
violate the separation of powers by imposing a “good cause” removal protection designed to ensure the impartiality of independent counsels.139 Although the President lacked the power to
remove the independent counsel and the Attorney General could
only do so for good cause, the Court upheld the statute.140
Congress’s power to impose restrictions on removal is not
boundless, however. Before 2010, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provided that members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), an independent agency, could only be removed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for
good cause.141 The statute defined good cause and gave PCAOB
members the right to “notice and opportunity for a hearing” before removal.142 A removal order was subject to judicial review.143 In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, the Court struck down these provisions.144 The
Court assumed, without deciding, that members of the SEC are

136. 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935).
137. Id. at 627–29.
138. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (upholding restrictions on the removal of a naval cadet-engineer).
139. 487 U.S. 654, 692 (1988).
140. Id. Many have speculated that Morrison’s viability is in doubt in light
of changes to the Court’s composition. See Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v.
Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998); Adrian Vermeule, Morrison v. Olson Is Bad Law,
LAWFARE (June 9, 2017, 8:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/morrison-v
-olson-bad-law. As of publication, Morrison has not been overruled, and the
Court cited it in Free Enterprise Fund as precedent for placing restrictions on
the removal of inferior officers. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 494–95.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2009).
142. Id. § 7217(d)(3).
143. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(a), 556(a), 557(a), 557(c)(B) (2009); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78y(a)(1).
144. 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010).
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subject to the for-cause removal protections outlined in Humphrey’s Executor,145 which gave PCAOB members two levels of
good-cause protection. The Court held these restrictions unconstitutional, and it severed the good-cause provisions from the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.146 The Court then used this holding to uphold the constitutionality of the appointment of PCAOB members more generally; without providing much explanation, the
Court noted that, because PCAOB members were now subject to
at-will removal by the SEC, they were inferior—rather than
principal—officers.147
The Free Enterprise Fund opinion created a great deal of uncertainty. While the majority emphasized the unusual nature of
PCAOB’s appointment and removal scheme, there is reason to
believe that hundreds or thousands of other federal officials
could be characterized as having two layers of good-cause removal protection.148 Perhaps most significantly, the broadest
reading of Free Enterprise Fund casts doubt on the constitutionality of any officer who is a member of the civil service.149 And in
contrast to the neatly severable provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act at issue in Free Enterprise Fund, civil service protections
come from a complex statutory and regulatory framework, rendering the majority’s severance remedy unworkable.
The majority in Free Enterprise Fund explicitly noted that
the opinion does not address the status of ALJs.150 It justified its
holding on the grounds that PCAOB members exercised enforcement and policymaking—rather than adjudicative—functions.151 Adjudicators are thus impliedly permitted to enjoy
greater restrictions on their removal. Reading between these
lines suggests that Free Enterprise Fund merely requires courts
145. Id. at 487 (“The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the Humphrey’s Executor standard of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’” (quoting
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935))).
146. Id. at 508.
147. Id. at 510 (“Given that the Commission is properly viewed . . . as possessing the power to remove Board members at will, . . . the Board members are
inferior officers . . . .”).
148. Id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing, as a “conservative estimate,” that the majority’s opinion could jeopardize the job security of 573 highranking civil service officials).
149. Id. at 538. The Court suggests, but does not definitively decide, that the
opinion does not apply broadly to members of the civil service. Id. at 506 (majority opinion).
150. Id. at 507 n.10.
151. Id.
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to consider the specifics of an agency’s design and an officer’s
functions to decide whether particular removal restrictions are
constitutional. It does not render two levels of for-cause removal
protection per se unconstitutional.152
6. Administrative Adjudication and the Appointments Clause
Administrative adjudicators present a special challenge in
applying appointment and removal precedents. Many likely possess sufficient authority to be officers, but at-will removal by political superiors could threaten their decisional independence.
ALJs have been the subject of several circuit splits in the
last two decades. ALJs hold a statutorily-created position with a
statutorily-defined set of duties.153 They preside over trial-like
proceedings at the agency level and issue recommended dispositions for review by the Agency.154 Statutes typically empower
agencies to appoint their own ALJs.155 Some courts held that
ALJs are mere employees because they lack the authority to render final decisions.156 Others rejected the “final decision-making
authority” requirement and held that ALJs are officers because
their office is “established by law;” their “duties, salaries, and
means of appointment” are set out in a statute; and they “exercise significant discretion.”157 After the en banc D.C. Circuit divided evenly on the question, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.158
In Lucia v. SEC, the Court held that the SEC’s ALJs are
officers.159 The Court relied primarily on Freytag: because the
152. See Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2391, 2392 (2011) (arguing that the Court decided Free Enterprise Fund
based on the specific combination of officer functions at issue). But see Neomi
Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free Enterprise
Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2541 (2011) (arguing that Free Enterprise Fund “creates a framework for challenging the constitutionality of
agency independence”).
153. See 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2017).
154. See id. § 556.
155. See, e.g., id. § 3105.
156. See, e.g., Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
157. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018).
158. Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), vacated,
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
159. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2047 (2018). The SEC, acting collectively,
is a head of department in which Congress has vested the appointment of ALJs.
The SEC had impermissibly delegated that authority to other staff members.
Id. at 2051 n.3.
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ALJs at issue had almost all the material characteristics of STJs,
they are officers.160 ALJs “hold a continuing office established by
law.”161 They “take testimony,” “conduct trials,” “rule on the admissibility of evidence,” and “have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders.”162 The Court found especially telling
that the SEC could choose not to review an ALJ’s proposed order,
in which case that order becomes final.163 This all added up to
significant authority, and because the SEC staff had not constitutionally appointed the ALJ that decided Lucia’s case, the
Court remanded the case for a new hearing before a constitutionally-appointed—and different—ALJ.164
Lucia is most notable for the questions it left unanswered.
Because the Court resolved the case almost solely by analogy to
Freytag, it offered no clarification on the meaning of the significant authority standard.165 And notably, ALJs enjoy two166—and
possibly even three167—layers of good-cause protection against
their removal. At the certiorari stage, the Solicitor General
asked the Court to address the constitutionality of these provisions,168 and at the merits stage he urged the Court to “construe
the statutory provision that addresses tenure protections for
ALJs . . . to permit the removal of an ALJ for misconduct or failure to follow lawful agency directives or to perform his duties
adequately.”169 This construction would seem, in effect, to allow
termination for policy disagreements, which contradicts the traditional purpose of removal protections.170 The Court declined to
160. Id. at 2053–54.
161. Id. at 2052 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991)).
162. Id. at 2053 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82).
163. Id. at 2053–54.
164. Id. at 2052, 2055. By the time of the decision, the SEC had already
taken unilateral action to cure the potential constitutional defect by ratifying
the appointment of all ALJs and remanding pending cases for additional proceedings. See In re: Pending Admin. Proceedings, Securities Act Release No.
10440, Exchange Act Release No. 82,178, Investment Advisers Act No. 4816,
Investment Company Act Release No. 32,929, 34 SEC Docket 82,178 (Nov. 30,
2017).
165. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2064–65
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
166. Brief for the Respondent at 20, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 17130 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2017).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 20–21.
169. Brief for the Respondent at 39, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 17130 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2018).
170. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that
for-cause removal protection did not allow the President to fire a Federal Trade
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address the issue.171 Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment,
would have resolved the case on statutory grounds: because the
SEC had not appointed Lucia’s ALJ—as required by statute—
remand was appropriate.172 Deciding the constitutional question
of ALJs’ officer status without deciding the “different, embedded
constitutional question” posed by their removal protections
risked undermining the independence of a whole class of career
federal employees.173
Lucia could have significant implications not just for the
ALJs within the SEC or the approximately 1,500 other ALJs, but
also for the approximately 3,300 administrative judges (AJs)
that conduct informal adjudications in other agencies.174 AJs
wield substantially similar power to ALJs and are even more
common.175 Agencies frequently choose AJs over ALJs for
greater flexibility and fewer procedural constraints, giving the
agency greater control over the adjudicative process.176 CDP officers, as informal adjudicators, fall into the AJ category. And if
CDP officers are inferior officers, their tenure protections may
be subject to constitutional limitations. Lucia therefore could
have major implications for the future independence of the IRS
Office of Appeals.
II. CDP OFFICERS ARE LIKELY INFERIOR OFFICERS.
In 2010 and 2012, respectively, the U.S. Tax Court and the
D.C. Circuit held that CDP officers are not “Officers of the
United States.”177 Those cases likely were wrongly decided. This
Part recognizes that, because CDP officers “exercis[e] significant

Commissioner for policy disagreements). But see PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d
75, 124 (2018) (Griffith, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that a forcause removal provision would allow the President to fire the official for ineffective policy choices).
171. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 n.1 (2018).
172. Id. at 2058–59 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
173. Id. at 2057.
174. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1643, 1652 (2016).
175. Id. at 1647.
176. Id. at 1649. Kent Barnett criticizes this tendency, suggesting that it
undermines impartiality and risks abuse in agency adjudications, which account for a greater and greater proportion of dispute resolutions each year. Id.
at 1650–51.
177. Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 125 (2010), aff ’ d, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C.
Cir. 2012).
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authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,”178 they
must be constitutional officers. But because of the degree of supervision they face, they are inferior—rather than principal—
officers.179 This legal conclusion carries normative pros and cons:
constitutional appointment could lend greater accountability to
the hiring process and improve the quality of decisions, but it
also jeopardizes CDP officer independence by placing their civil
service protections under constitutional scrutiny. Part III explores those consequences in greater detail.
A. TUCKER V. COMMISSIONER
The first reported Appointments Clause challenge to CDP
officers came in the U.S. Tax Court in 2010. In Tucker v. Commissioner (Tucker I), the Tax Court rejected that challenge.180
The court traced the historical development of tax collection in
the United States, noting a distinction between external revenue
personnel—historically appointed by the President or by the Secretary of the Treasury—and internal revenue personnel, who
could be employed without an appointment.181 Because no specific statute governs the hiring or appointment of CDP officers,
they are hired pursuant to the Commissioner’s general hiring
authority.182 The court’s conclusion therefore depends on its implicit assumption that the Commissioner is not a Head of Department for Appointments Clause purposes.183
The Tax Court held that CDP officers are not inferior officers but noted in dicta that, if they were officers, their appointment would be unconstitutional.184 Its conclusion was two-fold.
First, the CDP officer position is not “established by law,” a
threshold requirement for inferior officer status.185 The lack of
any statute or regulation providing something like: “There shall
be, within the Office of Appeals, officers designated as hearing
officers, who shall conduct CDP hearings,” convinced the court
that the law does not establish a CDP officer position.186
178. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
179. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997) (holding that
inferior officers’ work must be “directed and supervised at some level”).
180. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 125.
181. Id. at 132–33.
182. Id. at 135 (citing I.R.C. § 7804(a) (2006)).
183. See id. at 126; see also supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text.
184. Id. at 134, 165.
185. Id. at 152.
186. Id. at 153.
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Even if the position were established by law, the court held,
CDP officers do not exercise the type of significant authority that
warrants constitutional appointment.187 Relying heavily on the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Landry, the court held that CDP officers are not constitutional officers because their decisions “are not
‘final’ in the sense that is relevant to the Appointments
Clause.”188 The court also noted in dicta that CDP hearings lack
the procedural formalities exercised under the Administrative
Procedure Act by the ALJs in Landry.189
In Tucker II, the D.C. Circuit affirmed Tucker I, but on different reasoning.190 The court first noted that, while no statute
or regulation established a CDP officer position “in any formal
sense,” such a requirement “would seem anomalous” and could
be inconsistent with the substance of the Appointments
Clause.191 After casting doubt on this portion of the Tax Court’s
opinion, the D.C. Circuit bypassed the issue.
The D.C. Circuit rejected the Tax Court’s analysis of the significant authority requirement. In contrast, it held that CDP officers’ decisions are effectively final, but that the supervision,
guidelines, and consultation requirements to which CDP officers
are subject left their discretion sufficiently constrained to preclude officer status.192 It was this lack of discretion—not a lack
of finality in decisions—that caused the Appointments Clause
claim to fail.193 And while the court agreed with the Tax Court
that the procedural informality of CDP hearings could be “a signal from Congress of the weightiness of the substantive powers
granted,” it was not, in itself, a reason to deny officer status.194
Tucker received limited scholarly attention. After the Tax
Court’s decision and before the D.C. Circuit’s affirmance, Stacy
M. Lindstedt published an article arguing that CDP officers are
inferior officers under a newly-proposed Appointments Clause
framework, based on principles of administrative finality.195
John T. Plecnik disagreed in a 2014 article, arguing that the D.C.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 165.
See id. at 163–64.
Id. at 164–65.
Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1134.
Id.
Id. at 1135.
Lindstedt, supra note 30.
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Circuit’s Tucker decision showed that the officer-employee distinction was “close to fully developed.”196 Neither article had the
benefit of doctrinal developments in the last several years, and
neither addressed the potential constitutional problem posed by
CDP officers’ civil service protections.
There is reason to believe that courts will reconsider the
CDP issue at the circuit level soon. Litigants have brought Appointments Clause challenges in several cases pending before
the Tax Court.197 New circuit decisions could create a split and
lead to resolution by the Supreme Court.
B. CURRENT LAW SHOWS TUCKER I AND TUCKER II WERE
WRONGLY DECIDED.
Lucia v. SEC calls into question the holdings in Tucker I and
Tucker II. The Court in that case held that ALJs are “Officers of
the United States” and not employees because: (1) they occupy
“continuing” positions that are “established by law;” and (2) their
statutory duties constitute “significant discretion.”198 Because
CDP officers meet both prongs of the Lucia test, they are officers
rather than employees. But because of the supervision they face
from the IRS, they are inferior officers.
1. CDP Officers Occupy Continuing Positions that Are
Established by Law.
CDP officers are full-time government workers. Both statutes and regulations describe their duties and assume the position already exists.199 But because no statute or regulation expressly creates the position of CDP officer, some might argue the
position is not established by law and therefore need not comport

196. John T. Plecnik, Officers Under the Appointments Clause, 11 PITT. TAX
REV. 201, 204 (2014).
197. See Respondent’s Response to Motion to Remand at 1, Thompson v.
Comm’r, No. 7038-15L (T.C. Jan. 5, 2018) (arguing that CDP officers are not
subject to the Appointments Clause); Petitioner Motion to Remand at 1, Elmes
v. Comm’r, No. 24872-14L (T.C. Sept. 30, 2017) (arguing that CDP officers are
subject to the Appointments Clause); Order at 1, Fonticiella v. Comm’r, No.
23776-15L (T.C. Aug. 9, 2017) (denying petitioner’s motion for recusal on
grounds that the President’s authority to remove Tax Court judges does not violate separation of powers principles).
198. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052–54 (2018) (quoting Freytag v.
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991)).
199. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330 (2017); Treas. Reg. § 6330-1 (2018).
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with the Appointments Clause.200 While the Court in Lucia
acknowledged that an officer’s position must be established by
law, it has not equated “established by law” with “created by
statute or regulation.”201 Doing so would create a doctrinal gap;
Congress could evade the Appointments Clause by conferring
duties—no matter how significant—collectively on the employees of a particular department.202 The Court has consistently focused on the continuing nature of the office and the significance
of the office’s duties rather than the superficial aspects of its creation.203 An individual exercising the duties of an officer is an
officer. Moreover, requiring that a statute prescribe an officer’s
means of appointment comes close to the tautological reasoning
of early Supreme Court cases on the issue (i.e., government
workers are officers that must be appointed if they are, in fact,
appointed).204 A more appropriate question to ask is whether the
purported officer holds a continuing position and carries out significant duties that the law requires someone to carry out.205
That is clearly the case with CDP officers.
2. CDP Officers Exercise Significant Authority.
The Court in Lucia offered several factors that make the authority ALJs exercise significant: ALJs “take testimony, conduct
trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power
to enforce discovery orders.”206 In the course of these duties, they

200. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 114, 152–59 (2010), aff ’ d, 676 F.3d 1129
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that CDP officers do not hold a position “established
by law”).
201. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053 (holding that the ALJ position is established by law because it is created by statute, but not deciding whether statutory creation is the exclusive means of establishing an office).
202. See Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133 (“[I]t would seem anomalous if the Appointments Clause were inapplicable to positions extant in the bureaucratic hierarchy . . . merely because neither Congress nor the executive branch had formally created the positions.”); see also Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1172–73
(arguing that a formal requirement of statutory or regulatory creation is “subject to congressional manipulation”).
203. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053 (comparing the duties of ALJs to the duties
of STJs).
204. See Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments
Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 115–17 (2007).
205. Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1177 (citing Officers of the U.S. Within the
Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73 (2007)).
206. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053.
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“exercise significant discretion.”207 In at least some cases, they
render final decisions.208
To be sure, CDP officers’ duties do not line up “point for
point” with those of the ALJs in Lucia or the STJs in Freytag,209
but the similarities are nonetheless striking. CDP officers have
significant discretion over how to conduct their proceedings, including whether to allow the taxpayer to present witnesses.210
They must consider all relevant information that the taxpayer
presents on spousal defenses, the “appropriateness” of IRS collection actions, and offers of collection alternatives.211 When the
taxpayer has not previously had an opportunity to challenge the
underlying tax liability, the officer may consider that as well.212
It is difficult to see how this does not qualify as taking testimony
in some sense. CDP officers issue a decision that is final if the
taxpayer does not appeal to the Tax Court. If the taxpayer does
appeal, the court reviews the determination under an abuse of
discretion standard.213
Moreover, the Court’s pre-Lucia Appointments Clause jurisprudence remains intact, and the language it has used to describe officers in the past only reinforces the conclusion here.
CDP officers almost certainly are “charged with ‘the administration and enforcement of the public law;’”214 they ensure that taxpayers can exercise a statutorily created right within the tax collection system. Early commentators recognized that those
“connected with the administration of justice [and] the collection

207. Id. (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991)).
208. See, e.g., id. at 2048 (“In a major Tax Court case, a regular Tax Court
judge must always review an STJ’s opinion, and that opinion comes to nothing
unless the regular judge adopts it. By contrast, the SEC can decide against reviewing an ALJ’s decision, and when it does so the ALJ’s decision itself ‘becomes
final’ and is ‘deemed the action of the Commission.’” (quoting 17 C.F.R.
§ 201.360(d)(2) (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(c) (2015))).
209. See id. (comparing ALJs and STJs).
210. See Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1162.
211. Brief for Harvard Federal Tax Clinic as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Appellant at 6–7, Byers v. Comm’r, No. 17-2652 (8th Cir. Oct. 26, 2017)
[hereinafter Harvard Brief ] (quoting I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2017)).
212. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(B) (2017).
213. Sego v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).
214. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
139 (1976)).
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of the revenue” were some of the “most important civil officers.”215 When CDP officers issue a decision in the taxpayer’s favor, the decision is final.216 As full-time government employees
carrying out statutorily defined duties, they can almost certainly, in some sense, “be said to hold an office.”217 Even superficially comparing CDP officers with others held to be officers in
the past compels the conclusion that CDP officers fall within the
term’s “unusually broad” sweep.218 It is difficult to see, for example, how a district court clerk,219 a cadet engineer,220 and a “vice
consul temporarily exercising the duties of a consul,”221 would
exercise significant authority while a CDP officer would not.
There are two principal counterarguments. First, critics
may point to the differences between the statutorily-defined duties of ALJs and the more limited grant of authority to CDP officers. Congress provided a precise list of duties and powers for
ALJs to exercise, while leaving much of CDP officers’ duties undefined.222 But a lack of statutory detail does not lessen the significance of a CDP officers’ duties. Even when required to seek
guidance or permission from elsewhere in the IRS, CDP officers
have the power to make significant—and, at least occasionally,
final—decisions about a taxpayer’s rights.223 Neither Freytag nor
Lucia held that formal, adversarial procedures were a necessary
or exclusive precondition of significant authority.224
215. Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause,
31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 89 (2007) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1530, at 387 (1833)).
216. Harvard Brief, supra note 211, at 25–26 (observing that only the taxpayer, not the IRS, can appeal CDP determinations to the Tax Court).
217. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878)).
218. Id.; see also Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1173–74 (10th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (listing government workers previously held to be inferior officers).
219. See In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839).
220. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484–85 (1886).
221. See United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898).
222. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2017) (empowering ALJs as employees to
exercise enumerated powers over formal, adversarial administrative proceedings), with I.R.C. § 6330(c) (2017) (empowering CDP officers to preside at CDP
hearings and issue a determination).
223. See supra Part I.A.2.
224. See Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[W]e do
not understand Freytag to suggest that mere informality of proceedings, or the
absence of adversarial procedures, could justify denying ‘Officer’ status to one
whose powers would otherwise demand that classification.” (citations omitted));
cf. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051–52 (2018) (stating that the similarity
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Second, critics may argue that CDP officers do not exercise
significant discretion. The D.C. Circuit reached this conclusion
in Tucker II,225 and the IRS continues to advance this argument
in ongoing litigation.226 It is true that CDP officers must follow
Agency guidance and must seek legal advice on novel questions.227 But while courts have generally accepted that officers
must exercise some degree of discretion, institutional constraints on discretion are a form of supervision that is more relevant to the principal/inferior distinction than to the officer/employee distinction.228 CDP officers have the discretion either to
determine that a given collection action is appropriate or to accept a taxpayer’s offer-in-compromise, binding the IRS in the
process.229 That discretion is surely sufficient to make them officers.
3. CDP Officers Are Inferior—Rather than Principal—
Officers.
The institutional constraints that the IRS places on CDP officers likely makes them inferior officers. An inferior officer is
one “whose work is directed or supervised at some level by others
who were appointed by the presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”230 In Edmond, judges on the
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals were subject to the administrative oversight of the Judge Advocate General (JAG),
who was in turn subordinate to the Secretary of Transportation.231 The JAG would “prescribe uniform rules of procedure”
and meet with other Judge Advocates General to “formulate policies and procedure.”232 Even so, the JAG could not reverse the
judges’ decisions or use the threat of removal to influence those
decisions.233
between ALJs and STJs made it unnecessary to elaborate on the significant
authority standard).
225. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134.
226. See Respondent’s Response to Motion to Remand at 38–40, Thompson
v. Comm’r, No. 7038-15 (T.C. Jan. 5, 2018) (arguing that CDP officers are not
officers because they lack sufficient discretion).
227. See supra Part I.A.2 (describing ways in which agency guidance constrains CDP officer discretion).
228. See Burgess v. FDIC, 871 F.3d 297, 303 (5th Cir. 2017).
229. See supra Part I.A.2.
230. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997).
231. Id. at 664–65.
232. Id. at 664.
233. Id. at 665.
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Like the judges in Edmond, CDP officers must follow the
policies and procedures in the Internal Revenue Manual and
must often abide by the technical advice they receive from the
IRS General Counsel on novel or complex questions.234 They occasionally must seek permission to accept an offer-in-compromise.235 Still, the IRS may not reverse or appeal a CDP officer’s
decision.236 So while CDP officers’ discretion in decision-making
is constrained, their relationship to their superiors fits squarely
within Edmond’s subordination test. Subject to agency guidance
and deferential review by the Tax Court, CDP officers exercise
substantial discretion over the fate of the taxpayers that appear
before them.
***
While lower courts have attempted to impose more restrictive tests on the Appointments Clause, that approach is inconsistent with the vague and “unusually broad” definition of inferior officer that characterizes Supreme Court jurisprudence.237
It seems difficult to deny that CDP officers are inferior officers.
The more interesting questions are what to do about it and what
it means for their civil service protections. Does the chance that
those protections violate the Constitution jeopardize the adjudicatory independence of CDP officers? This constitutional headache might lead some to pause before concluding that CDP officers are inferior officers. But that is inconsistent with the
formalism that characterizes the Supreme Court’s inferior officer precedent.238 By contrast, its removal precedent, discussed
above, requires an examination of an agency’s design and an officer’s functions—and the relationship of removal protections to
those functions—to make a constitutional determination.239
III. CDP OFFICERS SHOULD BE APPOINTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY BUT SHOULD KEEP
THEIR CIVIL SERVICE PROTECTIONS.
The conclusion that CDP officers are inferior officers creates
a potential constitutional mess. Who should appoint them? What
happens with previously decided cases and those that are still
234. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 64.
236. See supra note 64.
237. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (describing the broad sweep of the definition of officer).
239. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
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pending? And perhaps most consequential: are CDP officers’ civil
service protections constitutional?
Section A recommends that Congress vest the appointment
of CDP officers in the Secretary of the Treasury. Section B briefly
outlines remedies the Court can use to give the Agency a manageable logistical burden for constitutional compliance. Sections
C and D conclude that CDP officers should keep their civil service protections because their adjudicative role justifies the independence those protections promote.
A. CDP OFFICERS SHOULD BE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY
OF THE TREASURY.
First and foremost, as inferior officers, CDP officers must be
appointed. Congress can vest their appointment in the President, the Head of a Department, or the Courts of Law.240 The
best option is the Secretary of the Treasury.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue likely cannot continue simply to hire CDP officers because the Commissioner is
not a constitutional Head of Department. What exactly constitutes a Department for purposes of the Appointments Clause is
not entirely clear; while it may not need to be a cabinet-level department,241 it does not encompass “every organ in the Executive
Branch.”242 Because the IRS falls under the umbrella of the
Treasury Department, it is likely not a Department, so the Commissioner is not a constitutional Head of Department.243 And
even if the Commissioner could be construed as a Head of Department, vesting the selection of CDP officers in the Commissioner may not be consistent with the impartial, detached relationship those officers are meant to hold with the collection
process of the Agency.244 If CDP officers are chosen by the individual that oversees the IRS—rather than by the IRS itself—
they may feel less pressure to side with their direct superiors.
240. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. This Note concludes that presidential appointment of CDP officers, with or without Senate confirmation, is both impracticable and unnecessary.
241. But see Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886 (1991) (confining the term
Departments “to executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments”).
242. Id. at 885.
243. Id. Justice Scalia, writing for four Justices, would have held that “all
independent executive establishments [are Departments].” Id. at 919 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
244. See I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017) (requiring that CDP officers be impartial);
IRM § 8.1.10 (Sept. 28, 2017) (restricting ex parte communications between
CDP officers and other IRS functions).
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Allowing the appointment of CDP officers by the Secretary
of the Treasury addresses both issues. The Secretary is undoubtedly a Head of Department for purposes of the Appointments
Clause.245 The Secretary is a presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed officer246 who is removable at will by the President, making him or her accountable for the quality of appointments. Vesting appointment in the Secretary can minimize the
procedural burden of presidential appointment and Senate confirmation247 while capitalizing on the Secretary’s likely expertise
concerning the proper qualifications for revenue officers. This
would certainly represent an increase in the number of appointees each year, but it would be a comparative drop in the
bucket.248 Indeed, granting the Secretary this appointment
power would likely be the quickest and least disruptive route to
constitutional compliance. Moreover, placing the responsibility
for appointments with the Head of Treasury may lessen the
risk—whether actual or perceived—that CDP officers hired by
the IRS will be biased in favor of the Agency.
Appointment by a court of law might seem an appropriate
choice, given CDP officers’ adjudicative role and the requirement
that they be impartial,249 but that option creates its own constitutional complications. While the Court has upheld interbranch
appointments in the past,250 the extent to which they are permitted is unclear.251 Some commentators have argued that the text
of the Appointments Clause only allows Courts of Law to appoint
their own inferior officers—clerks, for example.252 Moreover,
judges cannot be removed at will or voted out of office; even if, as

245. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886 (differentiating between a secretary and
an inferior officer).
246. See 31 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2017).
247. See Lindstedt, supra note 30, at 1186–87 (describing the logistical and
political advantages of appointment by heads of departments).
248. See id. (noting that the government had been able to manage “the annual appointment of roughly 240,000 military officers in the past”).
249. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017).
250. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673–76 (1988) (upholding the
appointment of an independent counsel by a special Article III court).
251. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (holding that Congress could not retain the power to remove the Comptroller General), with Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 411 n.35 (1989) (“Nothing in Bowsher,
however, suggests that one Branch may never exercise removal power, however
limited, over members of another Branch.”) (emphasis added).
252. Jennifer L. Mascott, Constitutionally Conforming Agency Adjudication,
2 LOY. J. REG. COMPLIANCE 22, 30 (2017).
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discussed below, adjudicatory independence justifies some insulation from removal once a CDP officer is in office, appointment
by an executive branch official can ensure some level of prospective accountability for the quality of appointments. Appointment
by a court would be inconsistent with this purpose of the Clause.
Appointment by the President, with or without confirmation
by the Senate, is both unnecessary and impractical. The large
number of CDP officers253 would further clog an already hampered presidential nomination process.254 Moreover, inferior officers are typically appointed by principal officers that supervise
them.255 Here, it makes sense for the Secretary, who theoretically possesses more specific expertise than the President in the
needs of the tax system, to choose the people that carry out the
Agency’s rules and directives.
Congress and the IRS need not wade into these constitutional and logistical complexities to solve the problem at hand.
Providing for appointment by the Secretary of the Treasury is
the quickest and cleanest—albeit a slightly formalistic—way to
resolve the constitutional issue, and as discussed in Section D
below, it strikes the best balance between independence and accountability.
B. A HOLDING THAT CDP OFFICERS ARE INFERIOR OFFICERS
NEED NOT INVALIDATE PREVIOUSLY DECIDED CASES.
If CDP officers have not been constitutionally appointed to
date, what happens to the many thousands of decisions they
have already issued or to currently pending cases? This concern
has come up in the ALJ cases that led to Lucia.256 There is reason
to believe the Court would fashion a remedy to minimize the bureaucratic chaos.
253. At the end of FY2017 there were 857 CDP officers. Table 30: Personnel
Summary, by Employment Status, Budget Activity, and Selected Personnel
Type, Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs
.gov/statistics/irs-budget-and-workforce (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
254. Cf. Sheldon Goldman, Tracking Obstruction and Delay in U.S. Senate
Confirmations of Judges to the Federal Courts, SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK
(July 1, 2013), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/tracking
-obstruction-and-delay-us-senate-confirmations-judges-federal-courts (discussing how the nomination process is known for its logistical and political delays).
255. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997) (“[T]here shall
be in the said department, an inferior officer, to be appointed by the said principal officer . . . .” (quoting Act of 27 July 1789, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28 (1789))).
256. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1201 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018) (“Today’s holding risks throwing much into disarray.”).
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In the past, the Court has applied remedial-mitigation doctrines to retroactively validate actions taken by “entire administrative or legislative bodies.”257 After the Supreme Court found
in Buckley v. Valeo that the FEC’s structure violated the Appointments Clause, it granted all of the agency’s past acts “de
facto validity.”258 It also issued a thirty-day stay on its judgment
in order to give Congress time to reconstitute the Agency.259 As
authority for this remedy, the Court cited precedent according
“de facto validity” to the acts of legislators elected pursuant to
unconstitutional apportionment plans.260 In a later case, the
Court limited the de facto validity doctrine to cases involving
election law or challenges to an entire agency design.261 But the
Court applied a similar retroactive remedy when it found that
bankruptcy courts violated Article III in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.262 The Court noted that
retroactive application would “not further the operation of [the]
holding, and would surely visit substantial injustice upon those
litigants who relied upon . . . the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts.”263 Whether or not the Court refers to the remedy in a
potential future CDP case as “de facto validity,” it is likely to opt
for a remedy it considers minimal and pragmatic.264
Mitigation is appropriate in the CDP case. Given the sheer
number of CDP cases resolved each year,265 reopening previously
closed cases would be entirely impracticable. Reexamining these
cases would delay implementation of a constitutional CDP process and could “visit substantial injustice” on taxpayers that relied on the past actions of the Office of Appeals. Just as it did in
Buckley, a temporary stay could allow Congress to address the
situation.
Professor Kent Barnett argues that these remedial-mitigation doctrines do not provide adequate redress for violations of
257. Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 528 & n.257 (2014)
(citing Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1995)).
258. 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam).
259. Id. at 143.
260. Id.
261. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183–84.
262. 458 U.S. 50, 87–88 (1982); Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 682 (2016).
263. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88.
264. See Kent Barnett, The Consequences of Missing Appointments, YALE J.
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 2, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the
-consequences-of-missing-appointments-by-kent-barnett.
265. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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challenging parties’ constitutional rights.266 He has a point; if
the Court has granted an unconstitutional agency action de facto
validity, the challenging party is left out in the cold with only a
pyrrhic victory.267 The Court could address this concern by
granting validity only to closed cases while requiring a new CDP
hearing before a properly appointed officer—and perhaps a different officer than before—in still-pending cases.268 The SEC
tried to do this unilaterally by ratifying ALJ appointments and
ordering new proceedings in light of the uncertainty created by
Lucia.269 In any case, a full assessment of the appropriate remedy is beyond the scope of this Note. For present purposes, it is
enough to note the precedent for remedies that fix constitutional
violations without creating an insurmountable logistical burden
for agencies.
C. CDP OFFICERS SHOULD BE ABLE TO KEEP THEIR CIVIL
SERVICE PROTECTIONS.
Holding that CDP officers are inferior officers and prescribing appointment by the Secretary does not end the discussion.
Restrictions on an inferior officer’s removal that improperly interfere with the President’s power to control the execution of the
laws are unconstitutional.270 But the removal protections that
CDP officers enjoy do not—and should not—run afoul of Free Enterprise Fund.
In Free Enterprise Fund, the Court noted that the two levels
of protection PCAOB members enjoyed were an unconstitutional
limitation on the President’s power to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.271 The Court noted, however, that the executive nature of the PCAOB’s functions supported its decision.272
266. Barnett, supra note 262, at 683; see also Kristin E. Hickman, Symbolism and Separation of Powers in Agency Design, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475,
1487–99 (2018) (arguing that severing unconstitutional provisions may not adequately protect the rights of challenging parties).
267. Barnett, supra note 262, at 681–83.
268. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055–56 (2018) (remanding for a new
hearing before a different ALJ than before).
269. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. The Department of Labor
recently took similar steps. See Office of Administrative Law Judges, DEP’T
LAB., https://www.oalj.dol.gov (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (describing the Secretary of Labor’s ratification of a chief judge and all other ALJ appointments in
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484 (2010).
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It contrasted PCAOB members with ALJs, who “perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions.”273 It
is thus a fair reading of the case that the nature of an officer’s
functions help determine the constitutionality of a given removal
scheme.274 Dual-layer good-cause removal protections are not
per se unconstitutional; rather, it is a nuanced question of officer
functions and agency design.275
The Court did not clarify the scope of Free Enterprise Fund
in Lucia, and it is unclear where the decisions will lead. The SEC
may remove an ALJ only for good cause as determined by the
MSPB. Members of the MSPB themselves are only removable by
the President for good cause shown. If, as the majority in Free
Enterprise Fund assumed, members of the SEC are removable
by the President only for good cause, then the SEC’s ALJs enjoy
three layers of removal protections. After the Court declined the
opportunity to weigh in on these protections in Lucia, the White
House took matters into its own hands, purporting by executive
order to strip ALJs of their good-cause protection.276
ALJs’ removal protections are distinguishable from those at
issue in Free Enterprise Fund. ALJs carry out primarily adjudicative, rather than policymaking, functions. While an agency’s
decision to bring proceedings before an ALJ could certainly be
characterized as policymaking,277 the ALJ is meant to play an
impartial, adjudicative role in those proceedings.278 The Court
left itself an out in Free Enterprise Fund; it can, and should, hold
that the removal protections enjoyed by ALJs are both constitutional and consistent with precedent.279
But no matter what the Court may do in a future ALJ case,
CDP officers should be able to keep their civil service protections

273. Id. at 507 n.10.
274. See PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 113–14 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Wilkins,
J., concurring).
275. See supra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
276. See Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 13, 2018); Kent
Barnett, Raiding the OPM Den: The New Method of ALJ Hiring, YALE J. REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (July 11, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/raiding-the-opm
-den-the-new-method-of-alj-hiring-by-kent-barnett.
277. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203, 209 (1947) (recognizing an
agency’s ability to choose whether to make policy through rulemaking or adjudication).
278. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10.
279. But see Jennifer Mascott, Revisiting the Record on Removal, YALE J. ON
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 5, 2018) (arguing that the Solicitor General’s
requested reevaluation of ALJ removal restrictions is relatively modest).
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notwithstanding their officer status. CDP officers play an important role in the tax collection process, but that role is adjudicative. The CDP program was enacted out of concern for the due
process rights of taxpayers,280 and the statute contemplates impartiality on the part of the appeals officer conducting a hearing.281 As described above, CDP officers exercise discretion and
judgment when deciding the appropriateness of collection actions.282 They receive factual information both from the IRS and
from the taxpayer and apply the law to those facts.
Even if ALJs’ removal protections are unconstitutional,
CDP officers are distinguishable. Because the Secretary of the
Treasury is removable by the President at will, there is no argument that CDP officers would enjoy three layers of removal protection. The majority in Free Enterprise Fund clearly implied
that two levels of good-cause protection could be permissible for
adjudicative officers. CDP officers are constitutionally secure.283
D. A PROPER APPOINTMENT, COMBINED WITH EXISTING CIVIL
SERVICE PROTECTIONS, STRIKES THE APPROPRIATE NORMATIVE
BALANCE BETWEEN INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
Providing for appointment by the Secretary of the Treasury
while maintaining civil service protections is constitutionally
permissible, and it also makes normative sense. The majority in
Free Enterprise Fund was correct to note the meaningful difference between policymaking and adjudicative functions. Adjudication warrants more independence.
The present CDP scheme has normative flaws in addition to
its constitutional violation. Civil service insulation without the
accountability of a constitutional appointment reduces the incentive to make careful and high-quality decisions.284 The Secre-

280. S. REP. NO. 105-174, at 67 (1998) (“The Committee believes that following procedures designed to afford taxpayers due process in collections will increase fairness to taxpayers.”).
281. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017).
282. See supra Part I.A.2.
283. Even if a court were to find these two layers of good-cause protection
unconstitutional, courts could craft a remedy that does not cause the civil service to implode. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1190 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Briscoe, J., concurring), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018). Just as the Court
in Free Enterprise Fund simply severed the PCAOB’s good-cause removal provision and made PCAOB members removable by the SEC at will, courts could
hold that members of the MSPB are removable at will by the President. Id. at
1190–91.
284. See generally TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REVIEW OF
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tary, and the President that appoints the Secretary, must be prospectively accountable for the smooth and effective operation of
the CDP program. Delegating the hiring of CDP officers to the
Commissioner, the head of Appeals, or a human resources office
dilutes that accountability and deprives the public of a clear target for its dissatisfaction.285
Invalidating the civil service protections as applied to CDP
officers would present its own problems. Giving a presidential
political appointee an absolute right of removal would strip CDP
officers of any semblance of the impartiality their governing statute requires.286 At-will removal would invite bias in favor of the
agency and reduced public faith in the tax system.287 In the context of an adjudication, such a scenario could even rise to the
level of a due process violation.288
This Note’s solution recognizes that all government actors
fall on a spectrum between total political accountability and total independence.289 Ideally, elected officials will fall close to the
politically accountable end, while Article III judges, with their
lifetime salaries and tenure, will come as close as possible to total independence. Agency actors fall somewhere in between, depending on a variety of factors, including: whether the agency is
independent or a part of the executive branch; the extent to
which the officer engages in policymaking; and whether the officer engages in rulemaking or adjudication. Appointment mechanisms and removal restrictions help calibrate where a particular officer or agency falls on the spectrum.
Naturally, policymakers and neutral adjudicators will fall at
different points. Of course, not all agency adjudications are the
same. Different forms of adjudication involve different degrees
of policymaking, and agencies typically may choose to set policy

THE OFFICE OF APPEALS COLLECTION DUE PROCESS PROGRAM

4–6 (2017) (finding both systemic defects and human errors in the operation of the CDP program).
285. Barnett, supra note 276.
286. I.R.C. § 6330(b)(3) (2017).
287. See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131
(1953) (describing complaints, prior to the APA, that adjudicators who were dependent on their agencies were subservient to the agency heads); Barnett, supra
note 276.
288. See Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to Administrative Adjudication
Should Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (2016).
289. See Hickman, supra note 266, at 1497.

424

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[103:385

through either rulemaking or adjudication.290 But some positions fall clearly in the neutral adjudication category; a CDP officer—whose job is to evaluate the appropriateness of a specific
collection action in a specific case according to established
rules—is one of them. While both adjudicators and policymakers
can be inferior officers that require constitutional appointment,
the Constitution does not require a one-size-fits-all approach to
their removal. It tolerates more independence for adjudicators.291
Appointing CDP officers while allowing them to maintain
civil service protections strikes the right constitutional and normative balance. It acknowledges that the significant authority
they exercise warrants their designation as officers of the United
States, but it recognizes that the Internal Revenue Code, due
process, and common sense require from them a certain degree
of independence.
CONCLUSION
The Appointments Clause contemplates a balance between
political accountability, independence, and effective administration of the laws. There is perhaps no area in which it is more
important to strike that balance than in tax administration.
This Note explores how the Appointments Clause developed
and how it has evolved (or failed to evolve) to accommodate a
government that is much bigger and more complex than the
Founders likely ever contemplated. Despite efforts by lower
courts to cabin the Clause’s applicability, Supreme Court precedent suggests that the provision casts a wide net that captures
the IRS’s CDP officers. CDP officers need to be appointed, and
the Secretary of the Treasury is the one to do it. Congress should
codify this change to achieve constitutional compliance while
minimizing the disruption that such procedural changes can
cause.
But the constitutional problem ends there. CDP officers’ role
as adjudicators justifies civil service protections to prevent arbitrary removal and to protect their statutorily-mandated impartiality. These restrictions do not improperly interfere with the
President’s control over the administration of the laws, and
there is room for them within the contours of the Constitution.
290. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203, 209 (1947).
291. See PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Wilkins, J.,
concurring).

